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Abstract. This paper deals with simulation of the broadcast 
authentication protocols using Colored Petri Nets and 
further optimizations in Matlab environment. Typical 
application of broadcast authentication protocols can be 
configurations where only one transmitter with multiple 
recipients exists (such as message exchange in sensor 
networks routing protocols, or the leader election process 
in sensors network). Authentication of every packet seems 
to be very effective way to mitigate an attack, however 
resulting in increase of end-to-end delay. To mitigate this 
drawback, the broadcast authentication protocols have 
been proposed. Concept of optimization of the broadcast 
authentication protocol DREAM parameters in a special 
case of fully N-ary tree and general random topology 
containing the same amount of nodes with regard to delay 
and energy consumption minimization is showed in the 
paper. Protocol DREAM was taken as an example of 
broadcast authenticating protocol to show how Color Petri 
Nets can be used to create a fully functional model of the 
protocol. 
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1. Introduction 
Currently, one of the most destructive kinds of attacks 
is Denial of Service (DoS), primarily its distributed form – 
DDoS (Distributed DoS). For the attacker, it is quite easy 
to overload selected server or whole network. Vulnerability 
to DoS attacks is much more striking in broadcast commu-
nication when each packet should be delivered to all nodes 
in the network. If the attacker is able to generate a suffi-
cient number of packets, the whole network can be over-
loaded. It is possible to avoid such incident by verifying 
the origin of each packet in the network before its proc-
essing in the node. However, in the network whose nodes 
have limited computing power and memory (typical for 
sensor networks), each authentication process using tradi-
tional public key cryptographic techniques is quite burden-
some. A big number of these calculations lead to growth of 
time that the packets spent in the network and communica-
tion among nodes becomes almost impossible. In the case 
of broadcast communication, this issue can be efficiently 
solved by DREAM (DoS-Resistant Efficient Authentica-
tion Mechanism) [1] protocol. 
2. DREAM Protocol 
DDoS is so powerful since it uses multiple systems as 
resources of the attack and therefore, it is much stronger 
than a single sourced attack. DREAM mitigates the DDoS 
impact by involving an analogous approach which the 
DDoS uses itself. The only difference is that more stations 
are involved in the process of verification. The DREAM 
protocol can operate in two modes: normal and secure. 
Every incoming message is authenticated by the network 
node before being sent to the outgoing interface in the 
secure mode. In the normal mode, some of the messages 
are sent directly to the outgoing interface without being 
authenticated. This approach mitigates the potential single 
point of failure in the whole network since there is not 
a single node where authentication occurs. The verification 
process is distributed among the neighboring nodes. The 
protocol functionality is influenced by the following 
parameters [2]: 
 NBR – number of neighbors. 
 HT – number of nodes that message passed without 
authentication. For such each node, the parameter is 
incremented by one. When the packet is authenticated 
HT is set to zero. 
 K – maximum number of nodes, that can message 
pass without authentication. 
 b – expected number of neighbors in unity distance 
from the source. 
 c – expected number of neighbors in unity distance 
from the last node that forwards the message. 
The amount of messages to be sent or verified before 
sending out the interface is defined by the following 
decision rules (formulas) [2]: 
 
NBR
bRand  , (1) 
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NBR
cRand 2  (2) 
where Rand is a random number generated independently 
by every node for every message in the range of 0 and 1 
with the continuous uniform distribution [1]. The first 
formula is used when the message comes directly from 
a neighbor, a neighbor has been verified, or the parameter 
HT = 0. The second formula is used if the message did not 
come from a neighbor, or a neighbor has not been verified, 
or the parameter HT > 0.  
3. Model of DREAM Mechanism 
Two very different tools have been used to create 
a model of DREAM protocol and simulation of the process 
of authentication. The finite state machine using of the 
protocol was done in Colored Petri Nets (CPN) while 
simulation of spreading the messages through network was 
done in Matlab. 
3.1 Colored Petri Nets 
A Petri net is a formalism that can be used to describe 
systems or protocols. It has some differences to the classi-
cal finite state machine. The most significant difference is 
the ability to describe concurrency among processes. 
A Petri net consists of places and transitions which are 
connected by unidirectional curves. The Petri net formal-
ism is very powerful in describing the behavior of systems 
where the actions are performed in sequences. The Colored 
Petri Net [2] is an extension which consists in using the 
“colors'' in the Petri nets. This is a very helpful approach to 
describe most of the details which should be shown when 
modeling some complex systems. The tokens in a colored 
Petri net are not equal one to each other but they are differ-
entiated by means of colors [3]. 
The model of the protocol was created in CPN Tools 
2.2.0 [2], [3]. Fig. 1 depicts the protocol described as 
a finite state machine. The model itself can be divided into 
six main parts. In the first one, the initial check is done to 
find whether a packet was received in the past or not. This 
is done by checking the sequence number of the packet and 
the ID of the source. The second part analyses the ID of the 
last node that accomplished the verification. Only mes-
sages from trusted neighbors are accepted. In the next step, 
normal or secure mode is selected. In the fourth part, the 
decision making process is based on the number of nodes 
passed without verification (HT). Messages that have 
undergone the maximum number of nodes without verifi-
cation are immediately sent to the queue for verification. In 
the next step, the reports are divided into two sets, the first 
with HT equal to zero and the second with HT greater than 
zero and less than the maximum permissible value. The 
model further branches into two parts. The left part of the 
messages will be sent prior to authentication. In these mes-
sages, the variable HT is increased by one and they are sent 
afterwards. For the messages in the right part of the model, 
namely those for which there is first verification and then 
they are sent, the variable HT is set to zero and are then 
sent to a queue for verification.  
The whole model has thus three exit points: dropped 
msg, msg sent, and counter count. The msg dropped con-
tains all the messages that have been discarded, whether on 
the basis of duplicate sequence, unknown neighbor, or 
a false signature. In the msg sent only sent messages are 
stored, i.e., those which were sent without verification and 
sent with the verification. The counter contains information 
about the number of true and false reports from the certifi-
cation module.  
The general DREAM model has been reduced ac-
cording to considered assumptions which are explained in 
section 3.2. Slightly modified protocol was used in N-ary 
tree topology. Since this topology is loop-free we dropped 
detection module of repeated messages. Another assump-
tion was that the protocol worked only in normal mode, so 
the detection of falsified messages was removed. 
3.2 Analysis of the Protocol Parameters 
A time unit for authenticated and sent message has 
been determined as 100 % and the time unit for message 
sent without verification estimated as 20 % of the deter-
mined time unit. Since the duplicate message detection 
process checks only the received packet ID and a time unit 
of such procedure has been estimated as 1 – 2 %. The 
simulation considers the following assumptions: if a dupli-
cate packet is received, it is immediately dropped by the 
system. Such time is negligible compared to the verifica-
tion and decision based times. Since a packet is being veri-
fied in every single node, a small amount of time is saved 
only by sending the packet before verification is executed. 
Such assumptions enable to change the general 
network topology into a loop free network scheme – into 
a tree and to omit the packet duplicity detection. 
Consideration that every single node of the tree topology is 
connected to the same number of neighboring nodes results 
into an N-ary tree topology. 
For the first simulation, the following expectations 
have been considered: 
 The network contains only one transmitter. All other 
nodes are engaged into verification and forwarding 
processes only. 
 The topology of the network is unchanged during the 
simulation, i.e., the number of neighbors does not 
change either. 
 All the nodes are working in the normal (not the 
secured) mode during the whole simulation. 
 Every node has exactly the same number of neighbors 
so the network topology represents a fully N-ary tree 
and resulting into the loop-free topology 
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Fig. 1. The model of complete DREAM protocol in CPN environment. 
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Values c or b lesser that zero cause the model to en-
force each node to work in the secure mode resulting in 
verification of all incoming messages before sending them. 
On the other hand, values c ≥ NBR/2 and b ≥ NBR cause 
that each node sends the message without being verified. 
Therefore the parameters b and c have been selected with 
respect to (1) and (2) to ensure the random model behavior. 
This means that the parameters b and c must confirm the 
following conditions [4], [5]: 
 NBRb 0 , (3) 
 2
0 NBRc   (4) 
To limit the network topology and to respect the 
practical application of the simulation, a length variable 
has been determined and defined as follows: the length is 
the maximum number of nodes in a row to be passed by the 
message from the transmitter to the last node (a leaf of the 
tree). Since the total number of all nodes depends on NBR 
and length parameters, it can be counted as (5): 
 




length
i
lengthi
NBR
NBR
NBR
NBR
0
1
1
1
1
 (5) 
where NBR ≠ 1. To reflect the practical usage of this 
simulation, the length variable has been selected with 
respect to the NBR variable to generate at the most one 
million of nodes in total. 
The selection of the parameter K value higher than the 
length value does not affect the simulation. The packet 
cannot get further than the maximum network length: 
 lengthK 0 . (6) 
4. Simulations 
In the following section, the general network of 
a large amount of mutually interconnected nodes is consid-
ered. The goal of the simulation is to analyze the protocol 
parameter influence on the unit time delay caused by the 
authentication process. The following two topologies are 
considered – a loop-free topology with a constant number 
of neighbors in each node and a random topology (con-
taining loops and having a random number of neighbors). 
The authentication process is considered as general as 
well as the network. No other delays caused by specific 
higher level authentication methods or media access proto-
cols are assumed, thus do not affect the simulation process. 
The fact is that the total delay of the message each node 
will be also influenced by lower layers, e.g., specific MAC 
mechanism. However, there are other procedures that can 
cause the delay as well, e.g. low computational power of 
the nodes or small amount of memory. All these effects are 
specific for each model application. The model itself is 
general and independent on the lower layers. Therefore, 
this research was accomplished in the same manner. 
 
Fig. 2.  Number of unauthenticated messages depending on the 
number of neighbors. 
In Fig. 2, the percentage of unverified messages is 
shown in dependence on the number of neighbors and the 
parameter b. Remaining figures display the results of other 
simulations which were accomplished with NBR = 5. 
 
Fig. 3.  Number of unverified messages after passing the 2nd 
node. 
 
Fig. 4.  Number of unverified messages after passing the 7th 
node. 
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Fig. 5.  The average delay of all messages after passing 
through the 7th node for NBR = 5. 
From the presented figures 2 – 5 it can be seen that 
the difference between lines with the same parameter c and 
different values of parameter HT is much more significant 
only for a higher value of the parameter c. This is due to 
a higher number of messages that have not been verified 
and achieved maximum value for the parameter HT that 
caused a forced authentication. 
4.1 Simulation of N-ary Topology 
The Matlab simulation of DREAM in N-ary topology 
verified the importance of process selection of particular 
parameters. Incorrect choice of b and c parameters values 
can significantly affect the protocol behavior. 
 
Fig. 6.  Average unit time delay, K = 1, NBR = 5, length = 8. 
To ensure the model works correctly and retains the 
random character, these two parameters must be chosen 
with respect to the conditions (3) and (4). Similar recom-
mendation applies to the parameter K which does not have 
sense to select otherwise than with respect to the condition 
(6). 
 
Fig. 7.  Average unit time delay, K = 3, NBR = 5, length = 8. 
Simulating the same network topology (equal NBR 
and length values), the average unit time delay tends to the 
value of unit time delay of model when no verification 
occurs in the nodes (Fig. 6 – 9). The difference is only for 
K = 0 (verification in every node is enforced) and K = 1 
when the verification process proceeds very often when 
compared to the total number of nodes (Fig. 6). This 
behavior results into DREAM model independency on the 
K value (higher than 1) in the N-ary tree network topology. 
 
Fig. 8.  Average unit time delay, K = 5, NBR = 5, length = 8. 
 
Fig. 9. Average unit time delay, K = 7, NBR = 5, length =8. 
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4.2 Random Topology 
Simulation of the random topology is a little bit 
tricky. The issue can occur when the randomness topology 
is not used correctly during the simulation. Therefore, at 
the beginning of the whole process, a random topology 
with random number of nodes is generated and such topol-
ogy is used for further analysis and dependency of investi-
gated parameters on the whole protocol behavior. 
To be able to compare the random and N-ary tree 
topology, the total number of nodes in the whole topology 
preserved with respect to the practical application should 
be one million. The maximum number of nodes was 
chosen with the same respect to the first simulation and 
also to the practical application. 
 
Fig. 10.  Dependency of average unit time delay on K parameter 
The average unit time delay does not depend on the 
K parameter and is depicted in Fig. 10. In further simula-
tions, only the following values were considered: 
 50  K . (7) 
Since the b and c parameters should be chosen with 
respect to the NBR parameter which is being randomly 
generated at the beginning of the simulation, the interval 
was set from 0 to the maximum number of neighbors and 
the half of the maximum number of nodes respectively. 
This creates a little inaccuracy since the model forces the 
nodes to skip the verification process. However, this 
enables the simulations to be smoothly comparable. 
In the following figures (Fig. 11 – 14) it can be seen 
that the trend of K parameter value in a random topology is 
similar to the trend in an N-ary tree topology which is 
independency of the K value parameter. 
One can say that K is invariant according to the to-
pology of the network. It can be seen as a good property of 
the protocol, because, no special optimizations are required 
according to the physical network topology of the real 
network. 
In Fig. 15 the independency of K parameter on b and 
c parameters is depicted as for N-ary topology as for 
random topology. For each value of K, a simulation with 
randomly chosen parameters b and c has been computed. 
The parameters b and c have been randomly chosen with 
continuous uniform distribution from intervals respecting 
the conditions (1) and (2). The independence of parameters 
b and c has been demonstrated for a large range of values 
of K. 
 
Fig. 11.  Average delay of the message in the node, K= 1, 
random topology. 
 
Fig. 12. Average delay of the message in the node, K = 3, 
random topology. 
 
Fig. 13.  Average delay of the message in the node, K = 5, 
random topology. 
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Fig. 14.  Average delay of the message in the node, K = 8, 
random topology. 
 
Fig. 15. - Dependency of K parameter on b and c parameters for 
N-ary and random topologies. 
5. Conclusion 
The simulations verified the importance of process 
selection of particular parameters. Incorrect choice of b and 
c parameters’ values can affect the protocol behavior. To 
ensure the model works correctly and retains the random 
character, these two parameters must be chosen with 
respect to the conditions (3) and (4). 
The analysis shows that K is independent of network 
topology and also parameters b and c. To minimize delays 
resulting from the authentication process, it is advisable to 
choose K close to the diameter of the network. Another 
conclusion is that secure mode of the protocol is useless 
because it greatly increases the computational demands on 
the edge nodes. Better solution is to keep nodes in normal 
mode even in during a DoS attack and let the rest of the 
network to participate on authentication. Another possible 
solution is implementation of some kind of dropping algo-
rithm, e.g., WRED (Weighted Random Early Detection) to 
drop incoming messages regardless if they were genuine or 
forged.  
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